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Abstract
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This
paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This
is valuable information since many intractable voting problems become tractable given single-
peaked preferences. We prove that the problem of recognizing single-peakedness is NP-complete
for incomplete profiles consisting of partial orders. Despite this intractability result, we find
several polynomial-time algorithms for reasonably restricted settings. In particular, we give
polynomial-time recognition algorithms for weak orders, which can be viewed as preferences
with indifference.
Keywords: Computational Social Choice; Single-Peaked Preferences; Partial Preferences; Pref-
erence Domains; Domain Restrictions; Incomplete Information
1. Introduction
Both human and automated decision making often have to rely on incomplete information.
The same issue arises in collective decision making—voting—in multi-agent systems. Konczak
and Lang (2005) distinguish two main sources of incompleteness: The first one is intrinsic
incompleteness where a voter is unable or unwilling to give complete information. The second
one is epistemic incompleteness where voters are able to provide complete information but at
the time of decision making the required information is not fully available. Clearly, also a
combination of these two scenarios may arise.
Incomplete qualitative preferences are often modeled as partial orders (see, e.g., (Boutilier
& Rosenschein, 2016)). For example, if voters provide some pairwise comparisons between al-
ternatives, then partial orders arise naturally as the transitive closure of these comparisons. In
this sense, partial orders can be viewed as the most general model for (qualitative) incomplete
preferences while maintaining transitivity as a rationality assumption. A further standard as-
sumption in this setting (Boutilier & Rosenschein, 2016) is that voters have a true, complete
preference order, modeled as a total order. This total order is not available (due to intrinsic or
epistemic incompleteness), but the known partial order is compatible with the underlying total
order, i.e., it can be extended to this total order.
Real-world preferences—whether they are incomplete or not—tend to possess an underlying
structure, as they are formed by an implicit or explicit rationale. In this paper, we consider
∗. This work is based on a conference paper by Lackner (2014) and a follow-up conference paper by Fitzsimmons
(2015).
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a particularly advantageous structural property: single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948). The
single-peaked domain is one of the most commonly studied preference restrictions in social choice
theory (Gaertner, 2002). Single-peaked preferences arise if preferences are formed based on an
underlying ordering of alternatives, a so-called axis. It is assumed that voters have a most-
preferred alternative, their peak, and alternatives farther away on this axis are increasingly less
preferred. Single-peaked preference profiles enjoy many positive properties (see, e.g., surveys
by Elkind, Lackner, and Peters (2016, 2017)), both for algorithmic purposes and from the ax-
iomatic point of view from classical social choice. For example, the problem of determining
if a candidate is a winner for Dodgson, Kemeny, and Young elections is computationally hard
to compute (Bartholdi, Tovey, & Trick, 1989; Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe, 1997;
Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, & Vogel, 2005; Rothe, Spakowski, & Vogel, 2003), but efficient, poly-
nomial time algorithms exist when preferences are single-peaked (Brandt, Brill, Hemaspaandra,
& Hemaspaandra, 2015).
Another example of a desirable property is that single-peaked profiles are guaranteed to pos-
sess a transitive majority relation and thus a (weak) Condorcet is guaranteed to exist (Black,
1948, 1958). Furthermore, for single-peaked profiles there exist nondictatorial strategyproof vot-
ing rules (Moulin, 1984, 1991) (e.g., selecting a Condorcet winner); such rules do not exist for
arbitrary preference profiles by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterth-
waite, 1975).
If only incomplete preference information is available, it is a challenge to determine whether
voters’ preferences can be explained by a single-peaked axis. This is the main goal of this paper:
to investigate the algorithmic problem of recognizing whether an incomplete preference profile
may be single-peaked, i.e., whether the voters’ underlying complete preference orders are single-
peaked. The motivation to obtain this information is twofold: First, to know that incomplete
preferences may be explainable by a single-peaked axis provides fundamental understanding
about the nature of the given preference data set. Second, the single-peaked combinatorial
structure is highly advantageous for algorithmic purposes, also in the case of incomplete prefer-
ences. This claim has been corroborated by recent work, which we discuss below in Section 1.2.
We now give an overview of the main results in this paper.
1.1 Results
This paper deals with the question of how to determine whether an incomplete preference profile
(e.g., a preference profile comprised of partial orders) is single-peaked. This requires a definition
of single-peakedness that is applicable to more general types of orders than total orders, i.e.,
partial orders. To this end, we propose the notion of possibly single-peakedness, which is satisfied
if—given an incomplete preference profile—there exist a compatible complete profile that is
single-peaked. To be more precise, we ask whether a given profile of partial orders can be
extended to total orders such that the resulting complete profile is single-peaked (according
to the usual definition). Based on this definition, we analyze the corresponding algorithmic
recognition problem. In the following, let n denote the size of the preference profile (number
of voters) and let m denote the number of candidates. Our main computational results are as
follows:
• We prove that determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked is
NP-complete. This is in contrast to the case of complete preferences for which single-
peakedness can be determined in linear time (Escoffier, Lang, & O¨ztu¨rk, 2008). Further-
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more, we strengthen this result by showing that NP-completeness still holds if one voter
completely specifies his or her preferences, and also for the case of local weak orders.
Apart from these hardness results, we present polynomial-time algorithms for recognizing
single-peakedness in relevant subcases:
• First, we consider the problem of determining whether a profile of partial orders is single-
peaked for a given axis. We prove this problem to be polynomial-time solvable even for
incomplete profiles consisting of partial orders.
• Our most general polynomial-time algorithm is based on the consecutive ones problem.
By providing a reduction from single-peaked recognition to the consecutive ones problem,
we obtain an O(m2 · n) algorithm for profiles of weak orders.
• We also provide a direct O(m ·n) algorithm for single-peaked consistency for weak orders,
with the requirement that the preference profile contains at least one implicitly specified
total order. This algorithm is an improvement over the single-peaked recognition algorithm
by Escoffier et al. (2008) since it is applicable to a broader class of preference profiles (weak
orders instead of total orders) while maintaining its runtime.
• Furthermore, we present a 2-SAT-based algorithm, which also requires an implicitly spec-
ified total order, but is applicable to local weak orders (a generalization of weak orders).
This more general algorithm requires O(m3 · n) time.
• For the case of top orders (weak orders with all incomparable candidates ranked last),
we provide another direct, combinatorial algorithm with a runtime of O(m2 · n). This
algorithm does not rely on solving consecutive ones instances and thus is conceptually
simpler, in particular for implementations.
Finally, we consider the case that voters are unable to provide total orders because their true
preferences include some form of indifference. This gives another perspective on weak orders:
viewing them not as incomplete but as rankings with ties. We compare our definition of possibly
single-peaked preferences to other applicable single-peaked concepts, highlighting benefits and
drawbacks of our more general approach.
1.2 Related Work
As mentioned before, the single-peaked property is highly advantageous for algorithmic pur-
poses. This has been demonstrated for many social choice problems based on total (linear)
order preferences, e.g., in the work of Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann (2013), Brandt et al. (2015),
and Elkind and Ismaili (2015). Recent work has shown that similar benefits also hold for possi-
bly single-peaked preferences, in particular for profiles of weak orders. Peters (2018) shows that
several rules that are NP-hard otherwise can be computed in polynomial time for possibly single-
peaked profiles of weak orders. This holds for multiwinner rules such as Chamberlin-Courant,
Proportional Approval Voting, and the very general class of OWA-based rules. Furthermore,
Young’s rule is also polynomial-time computable for possibly single-peaked profiles of weak or-
ders; this follows from work of Peters and Lackner (2017), who prove this result for the more
general domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle. Walsh (2007) proves that com-
puting possible and necessary Condorcet winners in an incomplete profile (partial orders) can be
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done in polynomial time, based on the assumption that the voters’ true preferences are single-
peaked with respect to a given axis. Note that this result relies on the knowledge of this axis
and thus benefits from the recognition algorithms in our paper. Overall, the notion of possibly
single-peaked preferences has been shown to be beneficial for many algorithmic purposes.
Another interesting effect of single-peaked preferences is that the complexity of manipulative
actions (such as manipulation and control) often decreases for single-peaked preferences (Fal-
iszewski, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe, 2011; Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, &
Rothe, 2016). When we instead consider more general types of preference orders than total
orders we get different behavior depending on the model of single-peakedness used. In general,
the model of possibly single-peakedness does not yield such a reduction in complexity compared
to the general case for different manipulative actions (Fitzsimmons & Hemaspaandra, 2015,
2016; Menon & Larson, 2017). This is in contrast to the algorithmic benefits mentioned in the
last paragraph. However, here a decrease in complexity would not necessarily be desirable. In
particular, if one seeks to reduce insincere behavior by choosing voting rules that are compu-
tationally hard to manipulate, then a reduction in computational complexity removes this kind
of protection (Faliszewski et al., 2011). We also mention that Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra
(2016) consider the complexity of manipulative actions of the models of single-peakedness dis-
cussion in Section 6 as well as another related restriction, single-peaked preferences with outside
options (Cantala, 2004).
Recognition algorithms for restricted preference domains are also indispensable for charac-
terization results. The single-peaked domain (Ballester & Haeringer, 2011), the single-crossing
domain (Bredereck, Chen, & Woeginger, 2013), and the group-separable domain (Ballester &
Haeringer, 2011) have all been characterized by a set of forbidden subprofiles. These character-
izations are obtained by analyzing under which conditions recognition algorithms certify that
a profile is not contained in a preference domain. The Unguided Algorithm, as presented in
this paper, was used for characterizing preferences that are single-peaked on a circle (Peters &
Lackner, 2017). This was possible by relating the problem of recognizing preferences that are
single-peaked on a circle to the problem of recognizing possibly single-peaked preferences. Such
characterizations do not always exist, e.g., the Euclidean domain cannot be characterized by a
finite set of forbidden subprofiles (Chen, Pruhs, & Woeginger, 2017).
Our definition of possibly single-peaked preferences resembles that of a possible winner (Kon-
czak & Lang, 2005): A candidate is a possible winner if—given an incomplete preference profile—
there exist a compatible complete profile in which this candidate is a winner. The possible winner
problem is a central, well-studied problem in computational social choice (Walsh, 2007; Betzler
& Dorn, 2010; Pini, Rossi, Venable, & Walsh, 2011; Xia & Conitzer, 2011; Baumeister & Rothe,
2012), see also the survey by Boutilier and Rosenschein (2016).
The single-peaked domain is far from the only well-studied preference domain; many other
domains have been considered from a computational viewpoint. We refer to the survey of
Elkind et al. (2017) for an overview. Here, we briefly mention papers that build upon or are
directly related to our work. Another major preference restriction is the single-crossing domain,
characterized by an ordering of voters. Elkind, Faliszewski, Lackner, and Obraztsova (2015)
analyzed the recognition of incomplete single-crossing preferences. This work studies possibly
single-crossing profiles (a notion analogously defined to our definition of possibly single-peaked
profiles), but found that approaches like consecutive ones and 2-SAT reductions—which we use
here—yield weaker results in the single-crossing domain. In particular, fixing the underlying
order appears to have a much weaker effect on the recognition problem. Another notion is top-
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monotonicity (Barbera` & Moreno, 2011), for which questions similar to ours have been studied.
The results for top-monotonicity resemble those for single-peaked preferences, although new
techniques are required: The recognition problem for partial orders is NP-hard (Aziz, 2014) and
solvable in polynomial time for weak orders (Magiera & Faliszewski, 2017). Furthermore, Peters
(2017) highlights the inherent complexity of detecting more-dimensional Euclidean preferences
and discusses possible definitions for weak orders.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
In Section 2, we provide basic definitions from social choice theory. This is followed by Section 3,
in which we introduce our notion of possibly single-peaked preferences and study their basic
properties. In Section 4, we prove the computational hardness of recognizing possibly single-
peaked preferences. All algorithmic results are then presented in Section 5; this section contains
the most important contributions of this paper. In Section 6, we discuss indifference, weak
orders, and other models of single-peakedness. A final discussion of our results and suggestions
for future research can be found in Section 7. Some proof details (correctness proofs of some
algorithms) are delegated to an appendix, Sections A.1 and A.2.
2. Preliminaries
In this paper, preferences are represented by different types of orders (see Figure 1 for examples).
The most general type are partial orders: a (strict) partial order P on a set X is a binary relation
on X that is transitive (xPy and yPz implies xPz for all x, y, z ∈ X) and asymmetric (if xPy
then not yPx for all x, y ∈ X). We say that y is ranked above x if xPy holds. If for two elements
x, y ∈ X neither xPy nor yPx holds, we say that these two elements are incomparable; we write
x ∼ y.
A (strict) weak order is a partial order where the incomparability relation is transitive. Weak
orders have the same expressiveness as total preorders1 (also known as nonstrict weak orders
or preference orders). Since a weak order can be considered a ranking with ties, we refer to ∼
also as “indifference” in this context (cf. Section 6, where we discuss several other models of
single-peakedness for preferences with indifference). Weak orders are also referred to as bucket
orders (elements that tie are in the same “bucket”), cf. (Fagin, Kumar, Mahdian, Sivakumar, &
Vee, 2006).
A top order is a weak order where incomparability appears only among minimal elements,
i.e., if a ∼ b then both a and b are minimal elements in a top order. The ranked (i.e., nonminimal)
elements of a top order T are those that are not incomparable to any other candidate. We would
like to remark that top orders are also known as top lists (Dwork, Kumar, Naor, & Sivakumar,
2001; Fagin, Kumar, & Sivakumar, 2003) and as top-truncated votes (Baumeister, Faliszewski,
Lang, & Rothe, 2012).
A partial order with no incomparable elements is called total order, or, equivalently, a total
order is a complete (xPy or yPx for all x, y ∈ X) partial order. Any partial order P can be
extended to some total order T such that aPb implies aTb; T is then a (not necessarily unique)
extension of P .
1. Total preorders are binary relations that are transitive and complete (xPy or yPx for all x, y ∈ X). For our
algorithmic purposes, it is not relevant whether to use strict weak-orders or total preorders. Our main reason
to use strict weak orders as the standard definition is that total preorders are not necessarily partial orders
(they are not asymmetric) and hence do not fit in our hierarchy of orders.
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order order order order order
Figure 1: The order zoo: examples of different types of orders that are used to describe prefer-
ences.
Finally, we define a local weak order P on a set X to be a partial order on X with the
following property: there exist sets X1,X2 with X1 ∪ X2 = X such that the elements in X1
are incomparable to all other elements in X and the profile P restricted to X2 is a weak order.
Intuitively, a local weak order is a weak order together with some isolated elements for which
absolutely no information is available.
Throughout the paper, total orders are denoted by 〈c1 > c2 > . . . > ck〉; the brackets allow
us to unambiguously denote total orders consisting of one or even zero elements, i.e, we use
〈〉 to denote the empty order relation. For top orders, we write 〈c1 > c2 > . . . > ck > •〉 to
denote a top order where c1, . . . , ck are ranked as stated and all other elements (usually all
remaining candidates in C) are ranked last, i.e., are minimal elements. We sometimes use set
operators (∪,∩, \) on top orders with the intended meaning that we apply these operators to
the corresponding sets of ranked candidates. We describe weak orders with a notation similar
to top orders and use ∼ to signify incomparability, e.g., 〈c1 > c2 ∼ c3 > c4〉.
We would now like to address the usefulness of these types of orders for expressing preferences.
Total orders allow the voter to fully specify a strict ranking of options. Given a large set of
options, this might be unfeasible. Partial orders, on the other hand, allow the voter to specify
the relative strict order of any pair of options subject to transitivity, which can be viewed as
a rationality constraint. Thus they can be seen as a very general formalism for representing
incomplete preferences. They are compatible with total orders in the sense that partial orders
can always be extended to total orders. Weak orders are less general than partial orders but arise
in many natural scenarios. For example every real-valued utility function implies a weak order
(candidates with the same utility tie, i.e., are incomparable in our sense). Local weak orders
correspond to partial real-valued utility functions and thus arise in scenarios where voters do
not have knowledge about all candidates. If the elicitation of preferences is costly, one might
ask only for the most important (top ranked) options of each voter; in such a case we obtain top
orders. Top orders also are the natural type of order for specifying preferences in some scoring
rules. We will further comment on scoring rules and top orders at the end of Section 5.2.
Throughout this paper we use C to denote the set of candidates or options. Votes (or
preference orders) are considered to be either partial, local weak, weak, top, or total orders. For
a vote Vi, we use x ≻i y to denote that x is ranked above y (i.e., yVix). If there is only one
vote under consideration, usually denoted by V , we omit the index and write x ≻ y. A tuple
(V1, . . . , Vn) of votes is called a (preference) profile of {partial orders, local weak orders, weak
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orders, top orders, total orders}, depending on the type of orders. Given a vote V and a set of
candidates C ′ ⊆ C, we define V [C ′] to be the order V restricted to elements in C ′. Analogously,
given a preference profile P = (V1, . . . , Vn), we define P[C
′] to be (V1[C
′], . . . , Vn[C
′]). We denote
the number of candidates with m and the number of votes with n.
3. Single-peaked Profiles
We start by giving a definition for single-peaked profiles of total orders and then extend this
definition to partial orders. A central concept is that of an axis, which is a total order on C. Let
A be an axis. Throughout this paper we write x ✁ y instead of xAy. (Note that we use ≻ for
votes and ✁ for axes.) We formally define single-peakedness for total orders below using triples
of candidates, so-called valleys. Valleys will be important for many of the results in our paper.
Definition 1. Let V be a partial order on C. A vote V contains a v-valley with respect to an
axis A if there exist c1, c2, c3 ∈ C such that c1 ✁ c2 ✁ c3, c1 ≻ c2 and c3 ≻ c2.
See Figure 2 for a visualization of v-valleys. The definition of v-valleys suffices to define
single-peakedness for profiles of total orders.
Definition 2. A profile P of total orders is single-peaked with respect to A if no vote V ∈ P
contains a v-valley with respect to A (and thus every vote has only a single “peak”). A profile
of total orders is single-peaked consistent (or simply, single-peaked) if there exists some axis A
such that P is single-peaked with respect to A.
Note that this is similar to how single-peakedness is defined in (Brandt et al., 2015; Elkind
et al., 2017), and easily seen to be equivalent. We now want to extend this definition to profiles
of partial orders. A natural way is to consider extensions of partial orders to total orders.
Definition 3. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of partial orders. The profile P is possibly
single-peaked with respect to an axis A if for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Vk can be extended to a total
order V ′k such that the profile of total orders P
′ = (V ′1 , . . . , V
′
n) is single-peaked with respect to
A. A profile of partial orders is possibly single-peaked consistent if it is possibly single-peaked
with respect to some axis.
While it is also conceivable to require that every extension is single-peaked (“necessarily” in-
stead of “possibly”), this would yield an extremely restrictive definition, basically requiring that
the profile of partial orders already contains “almost” total orders. We consider this definition
at the end of Section 6. Apart from that, we focus our attention on the more general definition
of possibly single-peaked profiles.
We now define an equivalent definition for possibly single-peakedness based on valleys. For
this, we first need the following definition of u-valleys.
Definition 4. Let V be a partial order on C. The vote V contains a u-valley with respect to
A if there exist distinct elements a, b, c, d ∈ C with a✁ b✁ d and a ≻ b as well as a✁ c✁ d and
d ≻ c.
In Figure 2 a graphical representation of v- and u-valleys is shown. These two types of valleys
allow a characterization of single-peakedness for profiles of partial orders.
Lemma 1. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of partial orders and A an axis. The following two
statements are equivalent.
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v-valley u-valley u-valley
a b c✁ ✁ a b c d✁ ✁ ✁ a c b d✁ ✁ ✁
Figure 2: Examples of v-valleys and u-valleys
(i) The profile P is possibly single-peaked with respect to A.
(ii) Every vote V ∈ P contains neither a u-valley nor a v-valley with respect to A.
Proof. To see that (i) implies (ii), note that if some Vk contained a u-valley in the sense of
Definition 4 then every extension V ′k would contain a v-valley. More concretely, if a, b, c, d ∈ C
form a u-valley in Vk then any extension of Vk either contains a v-valley with respect to A on
the candidates a, b, c or on b, c, d. Furthermore, if Vk contained a v-valley then so would every
extension.
For the other direction, we show that a vote V not containing a valley can be extended to
a total order that is single-peaked with respect to A. We recursively define its extension V ′
starting with the last ranked candidate. Let V ′(1) denote the last ranked candidate, V ′(2) the
second-to-last, etc. For the definition we require two functions:
• leftA(X) is the smallest (leftmost) candidate in X with respect to the axis A.
• rightA(X) is the largest (rightmost) candidate in X with respect to the axis A.
We now define for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
Xi = C \ {V
′(1), . . . , V ′(i− 1)} and
V ′(i) =
{
rightA (Xi) if rightA (Xi) is a minimal element in V [Xi],
leftA (Xi) otherwise.
.
This definition immediately yields that V ′ is single-peaked with respect to A: By always choosing
one of the two outermost candidates on A (that have not yet been chosen) for the next higher
ranked candidate, valleys cannot arise.
It remains to show that V ′ is indeed an extension of V , i.e., we have to show that for every
pair of candidates a, b ∈ C, a ≻ b implies a ≻′ b. Towards a contradiction assume that a ≻ b and
b ≻′ a. Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that V ′(i) = a. We have to consider two cases: a = leftA(Xi)
and a = rightA(Xi).
Let a = leftA(Xi) and d = rightA(Xi). Since V
′(i) = a, we know that there has to exist a
c ∈ Xi with d ≻ c. Observe that a✁ c✁ d has to hold. Furthermore, either a✁ b✁ d or b = d
holds. If a ✁ b ✁ d holds then a, b, c, d for a u-valley. If b = d then a ✁ c ✁ b, a ≻ b and b ≻ c
holds: a v-valley. Both cases contradict our assumption that V does not contain valleys with
respect to A.
Now, let a = rightA(Xi). This immediately yields a contradiction to the definition of V
′(i),
since b ∈ Xi, a ≻ b and hence a is not a minimal element in V [Xi].
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This lemma immediately yields a polynomial-time algorithm for checking whether an incom-
plete profile is possibly single-peaked with respect to a given axis:
Proposition 1. Verifying whether a profile of partial orders is single-peaked with respect to a
given axis can be done in O(m4 · n) time.
Proof. For every quadruple of candidates and every vote, an algorithm has to check whether a
u- or v-valley arises (by Lemma 1).
Let T ∈ {partial order, local weak order, weak order, top order, total order} be a type of
order. The remainder of the paper is dedicated to a more challenging computational problem:
T Single-peaked Consistency
Instance: A profile P of type T and a set of candidates C.
Question: Is P possibly single-peaked consistent?
Note that in contrast to the problem in Proposition 1, the input of this problem does not include
an axis. The Total Order Single-peaked Consistency problem is known to be solvable in
polynomial time as witnessed by several algorithms. Historically, the first algorithm to solve this
problem was due to Bartholdi and Trick (1986) and is based on the consecutive ones problem,
which we will encounter in Section 5.1. This approach yields a runtime of O(m2 · n), which was
improved by direct, combinatorial algorithms first to O(m · n+m2) by Doignon and Falmagne
(1994) and finally to O(m · n) by Escoffier et al. (2008). In the next section, we show that a
polynomial-time result is unlikely to exist for the case of partial orders and even local weak
orders.
4. Hardness Results
Theorem 1. The Local Weak Order Single-peaked Consistency problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-complete Betweenness problem (Opatrny, 1979). A Between-
ness instance consists of a finite set S and a set T containing (ordered) triples of distinct el-
ements of S. The decision problem asks whether there is a total order L such that for every
triple (a, b, c) ∈ T we have either aLbLc or cLbLa. Intuitively, a triple (a, b, c) ∈ T corresponds
to the constraint that b has to lie “in between” a and c on the total order L.
We construct a profile of local weak orders P with a candidate set C = S, i.e., we identify
elements in S with candidates in C. The preference profile P consists of two votes for each triple
(a, b, c): the partial order {a ≻ c, b ≻ c} and the partial order {b ≻ a, c ≻ a}. These two votes
form a valley on any axis with c between a and b and on any axis with a between b and c. Thus
b has to be between a and c on any single-peaked axis. We are now going to show that P is
possibly single-peaked consistent if and only if the Betweenness instance is a yes-instance.
“ ⇒′′ Assume that there exists an extension of P, Pext, and an axis, A, such that Pext is
single-peaked with respect to A. By Lemma 1 we know that this implies that no v-valleys exist.
Since for every triple (a, b, c) ∈ T both the vote {a ≻ c, b ≻ c} and {b ≻ a, c ≻ a} are contained
in P, we have that neither a✁ c✁ b, b✁ c✁ a, b✁ a✁ c, nor c✁ a✁ b can hold. Consequently
it has to hold that either a✁ b✁ c or c✁ b✁ a holds and thus b is “in between” a and c.
“⇐′′ Assume that there exists a set T such that all constraints in T are satisfied. It is easy
to verify that P is possibly single-peaked with respect to T .
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Corollary 1. Partial Order Single-peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
The proof of Theorem 1 uses preference profiles where the votes contain very little infor-
mation: only two pairs of candidates are comparable in each vote. We know that determining
single-peaked consistency is possible in polynomial time if every vote is a total order, i.e., all
votes contain complete information. What happens if one voter provides complete information?
Having a single completely specified vote has been found to be helpful in a related context: It
allows for the efficient elicitation of single-peaked preferences using only few comparison queries
(Conitzer, 2009) and thus the communication complexity of preference elicitation is reduced.
However, in our case such a voter does not provide enough additional information for a decrease
in (computational) complexity.
Theorem 2. The Partial Order Single-peaked Consistency problem is NP-complete
even if the given preference profile contains a total order.
Proof. We reduce from Set Splitting: Let X be a finite set. Given a collection Z of subsets
of X, is there a partition of X into two subsets X1 and X2 such that no subset of Z is contained
entirely in either X1 or X2? This problem is NP-complete even if all sets in Z have cardinality
three (Garey & Johnson, 1979).
Let X = {c1, . . . , cm}. For the construction, we identify the elements of X with candidates
and add an additional candidate x. For each set {ci, cj , ck} ∈ Z with i < j < k we introduce
one vote: {ci ≻ cj , x ≻ ck}. In addition, we add the vote x ≻ cm ≻ · · · ≻ c1. We claim that the
resulting preference profile P is possibly single-peaked consistent if and only if (X,Z) is a Set
Splitting yes-instance.
Assume that P is possibly single-peaked with respect to an axis A. We define X1 to be
the candidates on A left of x and X2 those that are right of x. We will show that there is no
subset of Z entirely contained in X1 or X2. Towards a contradiction assume that {ci, cj , ck} ∈ Z
with i < j < k are contained in X1. Then it has to hold that, on A, ci, cj , ck are all left of
x. Furthermore, from the vote 〈x ≻ cm ≻ · · · ≻ c1〉 then it follows that the relative order on
A of x, ci, cj , ck has to be ci ✁ cj ✁ ck ✁ x. However this order is not single-peaked for the
vote {ci ≻ cj , x ≻ ck}. Assuming that {ci, cj , ck} ∈ Z are contained in X2 leads to the same
contradiction. Thus, X1 and X2 indeed certify that (X,Z) is a yes-instance.
For the other direction, assume that (X,Z) is a yes-instance and that X1 and X2 are the
corresponding partition. Let an axis A be defined as the elements inX1 with indices in increasing
order followed by x followed by the elements in X2 with indices in decreasing order. We claim
that A is an axis for P. Clearly, the vote 〈x ≻ cm ≻ · · · ≻ c1〉 is single-peaked with respect to A.
Let us consider a vote {ci ≻ cj , x ≻ ck} with i < j < k. Since X1 and X2 are a valid partition,
at least one of ci, cj , ck has to be left of x and another one right. This rules out that a u-valley
is formed and thus all votes are single-peaked with respect to A.
As we will see in the following section, these two hardness results establish the tractability
frontier. For all remaining cases we will present polynomial-time algorithms.
5. Algorithms
5.1 The Consecutive Ones Approach
Our first algorithm in this section solves the Weak Order Single-peaked Consistency
problem in polynomial time. It uses a reduction to the problem of detecting the consecutive
10
ones property in a binary matrix, i.e., a matrix consisting of zeros and ones. Such a matrix has
the consecutive ones property if its columns can be permuted in such a way that in all rows the
ones appear consecutively. The corresponding decision problem is the following:
Consecutive Ones
Instance: A binary matrix M .
Question: Does M possess the consecutive ones property, i.e., does there exist a permutation
of the columns of M such that in each row all of the ones are consecutive?
The consecutive ones property was originally defined by Fulkerson and Gross (1965) and
shown solvable in polynomial time. More specifically, they showed that given an s × t matrix
this problem can be solved in O(s · t2). Booth and Lueker (1976) improved on this result
by finding an O(s · t) algorithm2 through the development and use of the novel PQ-tree data
structure. With this data structure it is not only possible to find one valid permutation of
columns (if it exists), but to compactly represent all possible column permutations that witness
the consecutive ones property. Subsequent work has improved these results in various ways
(Meidanis, Porto, & Telles, 1998; Habib, McConnell, Paul, & Viennot, 2000; McConnell, 2004).
Bartholdi and Trick (1986) were the first to relate the problem of recognizing single-peaked
preferences to the consecutive ones problem. We slightly modify their approach for profiles of
total orders to be applicable to profiles of weak orders, and by that solve the Weak Order
Single-peaked Consistency problem. The reduction works as follows:
Construction 1. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of weak orders over candidate set C with
|C| = m. For each Vi we construct an m×m binary matrix Xi. We assume that the rows and
columns of Xi are indexed by C. For a, b ∈ C, the entry of Xi is defined as:
Xi(a, b) =
{
0 if a ≻i b
1 if b ≻i a or a ∼i b
.
Finally, the matrices X1, . . . ,Xn are row-wise concatenated to obtain the mn×m matrix XP .
Example 1. Consider the preference profile P = (V1, V2) with V1 = 〈a ∼ c ≻ b ≻ e ∼ d ≻ f〉
and V2 = 〈a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ e ∼ d ≻ f〉. We construct X1 and X2:
X1 =


a b c d e f
a 1 0 1 0 0 0
b 1 0 1 0 0 0
c 1 1 1 0 0 0
d 1 1 1 1 1 0
e 1 1 1 1 1 0
f 1 1 1 1 1 1


X2 =


a b c d e f
a 1 0 0 0 0 0
b 1 1 0 0 0 0
c 1 1 1 0 0 0
d 1 1 1 1 1 0
e 1 1 1 1 1 0
f 1 1 1 1 1 1


2. More precisely, their algorithm has a runtime of O(s+ t+f), where f is the number of ones in M . In our case,
the matrices obtained from the reduction have Θ(s · t) one entries and hence this algorithm has a runtime of
O(s · t) .
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We then row-wise concatenate X1 and X2 to construct XP .
XP =


a b c d e f
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1


X ′P =


b a c d e f
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1


Observe that XP has the consecutive ones property, as witnessed by X
′
P
. The corresponding
permutation of columns (bacdef) directly corresponds to an ordering of candidates, and indeed
P is possibly single-peaked with respect to b✁ a✁ c✁ d✁ e✁ f .
To prove the correctness of Construction 1, we first define a valley-based characterization of
possibly single-peaked profiles of weak orders, analogous to Lemma 1. We see that for profiles
of weak orders, u-valleys are not relevant.
Lemma 2. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of weak orders and A an axis. The following two
statements are equivalent.
(i) The profile P is possibly single-peaked with respect to A.
(ii) Every vote V ∈ P does not contain a v-valley with respect to A.
Proof. That statement (i) implies (ii) is a special case of Lemma 1. For the other direction, every
u-valley on a✁ b✁ c✁ d (cf. Figure 2) implies a v-valley either on a✁ b✁ d or on a✁ c✁ d.
Using Construction 1 and Lemma 2, we can now show that:
Theorem 3. The Weak Order Single-peaked Consistency problem can be solved in
O(m2 · n) time.
Proof. Let P be a preference profile of weak orders. We will show that V is possibly single-
peaked if and only if the matrix XP , as obtained by Construction 1, has the consecutive ones
property. This proof closely follows the argument made by Bartholdi and Trick (1986) for total
orders, but requires Lemma 2 to relate possible single-peaked weak order to the consecutive ones
property.
If P is possibly single-peaked with respect to an axis A then by Lemma 2 we know that no
preference order V ∈ P contains a v-valley with respect to A. When the columns of the matrix
XP are permuted with respect to the axis A, no row will contain the sequence · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · .
since this corresponds to a preference order that strictly decreases and then strictly increases
along the axis A (a v-valley). Therefore X has the consecutive ones property.
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For the other direction suppose that V is not possibly single-peaked. Then by Lemma 2 we
know that for every possible axis there exists a preference order V ∈ P such that V contains a
v-valley with respect to that axis. So every permutation of the columns of XP will correspond to
an axis where some preference order has a v-valley. As stated in the proof of the other direction,
a v-valley corresponds to a row containing the sequence · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · , so clearly X does not
have the consecutive ones property.
Since it takes O(m2 ·n) time to construct XP and O(m
2 ·n) time to solve the corresponding
Consecutive Ones problem, we can solve the Weak Order Single-peaked Consistency
problem in O(m2 · n) time.
As mentioned earlier, the approach using PQ-trees by Booth and Lueker (1976) is able to
compute all possible permutations that witness the consecutive ones property. Thus, Theorem 3
actually allows us to compute all possibly single-peaked axes. As these permutations are stored
in a compact way, the runtime of O(m2 ·n) time holds even for a potentially exponential number
of axes.
To sum up, the consecutive ones approach grants us a simple and quick solution for the
Weak Order Single-peaked Consistency problem. The downside is that by relying on
the full consecutive ones machinery, any practical implementation has to deal with the nontrivial
PQ-tree data structure or related concepts (Meidanis et al., 1998; Habib et al., 2000; McConnell,
2004). In the following two sections we present direct, combinatorial algorithms.
5.2 The Guided Algorithm
We now present a second polynomial-time algorithm for profiles of weak orders. In contrast to
consecutive ones approach of Section 5.1, this algorithm requires an additional condition: The
input profile must contain at least one total order, the guiding vote, to guide the placement of
candidates on the axis. Due to this extra information, we gain two major benefits: First, the
algorithm is conceptually simpler than the more complex algorithms for solving the consecutive
ones problem. This has clear benefits for implementing the algorithm, and is also necessary for
the use in characterization proofs (cf. the work of Peters and Lackner (2017) as discussed in
Section 1.2). Second, this algorithm is faster. We achieve a runtime of O(m · n) compared to
the runtime of O(m2 · n) by the consecutive ones approach.
Theorem 4. If the profile contains a total order, the Weak Order Single-peaked Consis-
tency problem can be solved in O(m · n) time.
Theorem 4 is based on Algorithm 1, which we refer to as the Guided Algorithm. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the guiding vote is 〈cm ≻ cm−1 ≻ · · · ≻ c1〉, i.e., we number
the candidates based on the guiding vote. The requirement that this guiding vote is part of the
input can be weakened considerably. It suffices that a guiding vote is implicitly contained in
the profile. The following procedure finds such an implicit guiding vote, if one exists: Look for
a vote with a unique last ranked candidate. This candidate is ranked last in the guiding vote.
Remove this candidate from the profile and repeat this step to obtain the second-to-last element
in the guiding vote, etc. If at some point no vote has a unique last-ranked candidate, no implicit
guiding vote exist. It is straightforward to prove that adding such an implicit guiding vote to
the given profile does not change whether it is single-peaked.
The algorithm has a simple structure: The lowest ranked candidate in the guiding vote, c1,
is placed on the rightmost position of the axis (this choice is arbitrary.) Starting with the second
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AL {ci+1, . . . , cm} ci AR
(R1) (R2)
AL {ci+1, . . . , cm}ci AR
(L1)(L2)
Figure 3: Graphical representation of the conditions testing whether ci can be placed on the
right-hand side (R1, R2) or on the left-hand side (L1, L2)
lowest ranked candidate in the guiding vote, c2, the candidates are successively placed on the
axis—either at the leftmost or rightmost still-available position. The lists AL and AR correspond
to the left-hand and right-hand side of the axis under construction. For each candidate, we test
whether it can be placed on the right-hand side or left-hand side without creating a v-valley;
u-valleys can be ignored by Lemma 2. If only one of these options is viable, the candidate is
placed accordingly. If both left and right are possible, we place the candidate arbitrarily right.
If neither is possible, the preference profile is not single-peaked.
Testing whether a vote Vk imposes restrictions on the placement of a candidate is achieved
by four conditions. These conditions distinguish four categories of candidates: candidates in
AR, candidates in AL, candidates that have not yet been placed (C>i = {ci+1, . . . , cm}), and
the candidate that is currently under consideration (ci). We are only checking for valleys that
include ci. This gives rise to the following four conditions: (R1) and (R2) test whether placing
ci on the right-hand side leads to valleys, (L1) and (L2) do the same for the left-hand side.
Figure 3 displays a graphical representation. Note that we do not verify whether a v-valley
arises with aℓ ≻ ci and ar ≻ ci, where aℓ ∈ AL and ar ∈ AR; such a valley would have already
be detected at an earlier stage of the algorithm (cf. correctness proof).
Since we are working with weak orders, we do not have to consider every candidate triple
possibly fulfilling these conditions but have to check only maximal or minimal candidates. More
specifically, checking whether there is a candidate c ∈ AL and c
′ ∈ C>i with c ≻ c
′ is equivalent
to whether any maximal element in AL is preferred to some minimal element in C>i (subject to
≻). For k ∈ [n], let mink(X) denote a function that picks an element in X that is minimal with
respect to ≻k. The function maxk(X) is defined analogously. Now, we can formally define the
four conditions:
ci ≻k mink(C>i) and max
k
(AL) ≻k mink(C>i) (R1)
max
k
(C>i) ≻k ci and maxk(AR) ≻k ci (R2)
ci ≻k mink(C>i) and max
k
(AR) ≻k mink(C>i) (L1)
max
k
(C>i) ≻k ci and max
k
(AL) ≻k ci (L2)
Using these four definitions, we can give a succinct description of the Guided Algorithm,
(Algorithm 1). For a correctness proof of Algorithm 1, we refer the reader to the appendix,
Section A.1.
Theorem 4 claims that the Guided Algorithm requires O(m · n) time. Note that this is only
possible if the conditions (R1, R2, L1, L2) can be checked in constant time. Thus, the minima
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Input: A set of candidates C, a preference profile of weak orders P = (V1, . . . Vn) including
a guiding vote cm ≻ cm−1 ≻ · · · ≻ c1.
Output: An axis A or not single peaked.
1 AL ← 〈〉, AR ← 〈c1〉
2 for i← 2 . . . m do
3 right← true; left← true
4 for k ← 2 . . . n do
5 if condition (R1) or (R2) holds then
6 right← false
7 if condition (L1) or (L2) holds then
8 left← false
9 if right = true then
10 AR ← 〈ci ✁AR〉
11 else
12 if left = true then
13 AL ← 〈AL ✁ ci〉
14 else
15 return not single peaked
16 return AL ✁AR
Algorithm 1: The Guided Algorithm
and maxima have to be computable in constant time. For maxk(AL) and maxk(AR) this is easily
possible by storing and updating these two values: if ci is placed left, we update maxk(AL) in
case ci is the new maximum (with respect to ≻k); if ci is placed right, we proceed analogously
maxk(AR). For computing a minimal value of C>i, observe that the set C>i becomes smaller
with increasing i. Thus, a minimal value of C>i might disappear at some point and a new
(larger) value has to be chosen. The new minimum is the smallest element (with respect to ≻k)
in C>i that is at least as large as the old minimum. If we maintain pointers to the minimum
elements, the amortized cost of this update procedure is O(1). A maximal value of C>i can be
found analogously.
5.3 The Unguided Algorithm
Our next algorithm is applicable to top orders. As it is not dependent on a guiding vote, we
refer to it as the Unguided Algorithm. The Unguided Algorithm has a runtime of O(m2 ·n), the
same as achieved by the consecutive ones approach. We see that from the perspective of worst-
case complexity the Unguided Algorithm is inferior to the consecutive ones approach: while
having the same worst-case runtime, it is applicable only to a smaller domain (top orders vs.
weak orders). However, a point made in favor of the Guided Algorithm also applies here: The
main strength of the Unguided Algorithm is its relative simplicity. It can be seen as a solution
method for certain consecutive ones instances and—due to this specialization—does not require
the full power of consecutive ones machinery. It is thus easier to implement and can be used in
characterization proofs.3
3. Preliminary work with Dominik Peters indicates that the Unguided Algorithm can be used to characterize
the single-peaked-or-caved domain: A total order A is single-peaked-or-caved with respect to A if either T
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Input: A set of candidates C and a connected preference profile of top orders
P = (V1, . . . Vn).
Output: An axis A or not single peaked.
1 foreach cstart ∈ C do
2 A← 〈cstart〉
3 for i← 1 . . . m do
4 foreach vote V ∈ P that has ai as its top-ranked candidate do
5 if A⊕ V = incompatible then
6 Continue with next cstart ∈ C in line 1.
7 else A← A⊕ V
8 if |A| = i and i < m then
9 V ←IntersectingVote(A)
10 if ai /∈ V then
11 Continue with next cstart ∈ C in line 1.
12 Let x be a new candidate, distinct from those in C.
13 C ′ ← {c ∈ V | c ≻ ai} ∪ {ai, x}
14 for k ← 1 . . . n do
15 V ′k ← RepTop(Vk, C \ (A ∪ C
′), x)
16 P ′ ← (V ′1 , . . . , V
′
n)[C
′]
17 A′ ← axis returned by Guided Alg. with input (P ′, V [C ′], ai, x)
18 if A′ = not single peaked then
19 Continue with next cstart ∈ C in line 1.
20 else A← A✁A′[C ′ \ {x}]
21 return A
22 return not single peaked
Algorithm 2: The Unguided Algorithm
In the description of the algorithm we assume that the input preference profile is connected.
Let us consider the ranked candidates in a top order to be a hyperedge of a hypergraph with
candidates as vertices. A profile of top orders is called connected if this graph has only one
connected component. This assumption does not limit the applicability: if two or more connected
components exist in this graph, we can use the algorithm for each component (i.e., its respective
candidates and votes) and concatenate the resulting axes in arbitrary order.
The Unguided Algorithm (Algorithm 2) works as follows: First, we choose a candidate cstart
which is going to be the leftmost candidate on the axis A. Since we have no guiding vote, each
candidate might be placed at the leftmost position. Hence we loop over all candidates (line 1).
The corresponding axis under construction is A = 〈cstart〉. We now aim to complete this axis
by adding candidates to the right in such a way that all votes are single-peaked with respect to
this axis. To this end we employ the loop in line 3. In this loop (variable i) we infer from the
already placed candidate ai (the i-th candidate on A from left) the candidate ai+1 (or even more
candidates farther to the right), or infer that A cannot be extended to a single-peaked axis and
thus try another start candidate.
or its reverse is single-peaked with respect to A. This domain is clearly more general than the single-peaked
domain, but less general than the single-peaked-on-a-circle domain (Peters & Lackner, 2017).
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Lines 4 to 7 are based on the following observation: Let us assume that at a certain point A =
〈c1 ✁ c2 ✁ c3〉 and V = 〈c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ •〉 ∈ P. Since c3, the peak of V , is already contained
in A, there is only one compatible extension of A: 〈c1 ✁ c2 ✁ c3 ✁ c4 ✁ c5〉. We formalize this
extension operation with the ⊕ operator:
Definition 5. Let A be an incomplete axis and V a top order. Furthermore, let V [C \ A] =〈
c′1 ≻ c
′
2 ≻ . . . ≻ c
′
j ≻ •
〉
. We define A⊕V =
〈
A✁ c′1 ✁ c
′
2 ✁ . . . ✁ c
′
j
〉
if V is single-peaked with
respect to this axis and A⊕ V = incompatible otherwise.
The loop in line 4 considers all votes V that have candidate ai as their top-ranked candidate
(i.e., their maximal element). If A ⊕ V = incompatible then A cannot be extended to a
complete, single-peaked axis and we consider the next cstart ∈ C in line 1. Otherwise, we obtain
a new incomplete axis A← A⊕ V .
It might be the case that the (i+ 1)st candidate on A has not yet been determined after
these steps. The lines 8 to 20 deal with this case. As the input profile is connected, there has
to be at least one vote that ranks both a candidate on A and a candidate that has not been
placed yet. The procedure IntersectingVote in line 9 returns such a vote V with A ∩ V 6= ∅
and V \ A 6= ∅. This procedure can be efficiently precomputed in such a way that it requires
only O(m) time to provide an answer; details can be found in the proof of Theorem 5.
Let V be a vote returned by IntersectingVote. It holds that V ’s top-ranked candidate is
not placed on A yet: If its top-ranked candidate were contained in A, then V would have been
already considered in the first part of the algorithm (lines 4 to 7). If V does not contain ai (and
thus ai is ranked last in V ), A cannot be extended to a single-peaked axis (lines 10 and 11).
Now, we employ the Guided Algorithm of Section 5.2 to find a further extension of A. The main
idea is to use V as a guiding vote and find an axis for the candidates in {c ∈ V | c ≻ ai}. In
principle, this axis can be found independently of the existing axis A. However, the leftmost and
rightmost candidates have to be chosen with regard to “external” considerations: The leftmost
candidate has to be ai, otherwise A and the newly obtain partial axis A
′ could not be combined.
For the rightmost candidate, we have to consider votes with candidates placed on the axis in
future steps. The following example illustrates the issue.
Example 2. Let A = 〈c1〉, V1 = 〈c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ •〉 and V2 = 〈c3 ≻ c4 ≻ •〉. The vote V1
intersects A and hence C ′ = {c1, c2, c3}. We employ the Guided Algorithm and might obtain
A′ = 〈c1 ✁ c3 ✁ c2〉.
4 Now observe that A ⊕ A′ = A′ can no longer be extended in a way that
it is single-peaked for V2. This would have been possible if c3 had been chosen as the rightmost
candidate in A′.
As we can see from this example, we sometimes have to “force” the rightmost candidate in
A′. We do this by adding an additional candidate x to every vote (line 14 to 16). Hence, our
candidate set under consideration is at this point C ′ ← {c ∈ V | c ≻ ai} ∪ {ai, x}. The new
candidate x is now placed in each vote at the position of the highest-ranked candidate among
those not contained in A ∪ C ′. This is done by the RepTop function: RepTop(V,D, x) finds the
one candidate in vote V that is the highest-ranked among the candidates in D and replaces it
with candidate x. By forcing this element x to be the rightmost candidate, we ensure that A′ is
chosen with consideration to all votes with ranked candidates not in C ′.
4. Whether we obtain this axis or 〈c1 ✁ c2 ✁ c3〉 depends on whether the algorithm prefers placing candidates to
the left or to the right if both choices are possible.
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Example 2 (continued). We apply RepTop(V,D, x) to the votes V1 and V2 with candidate
sets C ′ = {c1, c2, c3, x} and D = {c4}. We obtain the votes V
′
1 [C
′] = 〈c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ x〉 and
V ′2 [C
′] = 〈c3 ≻ x ≻ •〉. Now, the Guided Algorithm can only return the axis 〈c1 ✁ c2 ✁ c3 ✁ x〉.
We obtain a profile P ′ on the candidate set C ′. We now run the Guided Algorithm with
input (P ′, V [C ′], A′, ai, x), i.e., we employ the Guided Algorithm for the profile P
′ and guiding
vote V [C ′]. Furthermore, we require that the leftmost candidate on the axis is ai and the
rightmost is x. The Guided Algorithm either returns not single peaked or an axis A′. If it
returns not single peaked, the next cstart ∈ C is considered. Otherwise, we continue with the
extended axis A← A⊕A′[C ′ \ {x}], i.e., candidate x is not placed on A.
Theorem 5. The Top Order Single-peaked Consistency problem can be solved in O(m2 · n)
time.
We refer the reader to the appendix, Section A.2, for the correctness proof of Algorithm 2
and its runtime calculations.
5.4 A 2-SAT Based Algorithm
Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Theorem 4 leave open the case of profiles of local weak orders which
contain at least one total order. Here, we show that this case is also polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 6. If the given profile contains a total order, the Local Weak Order Single-
peaked Consistency problem can be solved in O(n ·m3) time.
We encode a Local Weak Order Single-peaked Consistency instance in a 2-SAT
instance. The 2-SAT problem asks whether a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form (a
conjunction of disjunctions of literals) where each clause has size two (e.g., (a ∨ b) ∧ (¬a ∨ c))
is satisfiable. Solving 2-SAT requires only linear time (Aspvall, Plass, & Tarjan, 1979). The
Boolean variables in our instance correspond to pairs of candidates, i.e., for each a, b ∈ C we
have a variable ab. The intended meaning of these variables is that ab = true if and only if a is
left of b on the axis. Now, for each vote V and triple a, b, c ∈ C, if a ≻ b and c ≻ b (a, b, c may
form a v-valley), we add the clauses
(ba ∨ cb) and (1)
(ab ∨ bc) (2)
to the 2-SAT instance. These clauses correspond the requirement that b must not be placed
between a and c. Finally, we add for each pair of variables a, b the clauses
(ab ∨ ba) ∧ (¬ab ∨ ¬ba), (3)
corresponding to an exclusive or operator. Solving the 2-SAT instance either yields the infor-
mation that the instance is not satisfiable or a true/false assignment to the variables. In the
first case, the profile is not single-peaked (as shown in Lemma 3). In the second case, we obtain
a relation A = {(a, b) : ab = true} which is a total order and our desired axis (as shown in
Lemma 4). Since the instance contains at most O(n ·m3) clauses, we obtain the stated runtime.
Lemma 3. If P is single-peaked with respect to an axis A, then the corresponding 2-SAT
instance is satisfiable.
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Proof. We construct a valid truth assignment as follows: If a ✁ b on A, then ab = true and
ba = false. Clauses of the form (1) and (2) are satisfied because no v-valleys occur on A; Clauses
of the form (3) are satisfied because v-valleys cannot occur (P is single-peaked with respect to
an axis A).
Lemma 4. The relation A = {(a, b) : ab = true}, as returned by the 2-SAT algorithm, is a
total order and P is single-peaked with respect to A.
Proof. First, we want to show that A is a total order. Asymmetry and totality follow im-
mediately from (3). Towards a contradiction assume that A is not transitive, i.e., there exist
three candidates x, y, z such that {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)} ⊆ A. Thus, xy = yz = zx = true and
yx = zy = xz = false. Let V be a total order contained in P (there exists at least one). We
distinguish three cases:
• The last ranked candidate of x, y, z in V is y: By (1), it has to hold that (yx ∨ zy), which
is not the case.
• The last ranked candidate of x, y, z in V is x: By (2), it has to hold that (yx∨ xz), which
is not the case.
• The last ranked candidate of a, b, c in V is c: By (1), it has to hold that (zy ∨ xz), which
is not the case.
Thus, A is transitive. It remains to show that P is single-peaked with respect to A. Assume
that there is a valley a ≻ b, c ≻ b in some vote and it holds that {(a, b), (b, c)} ⊆ A. Due to
this valley, our 2-SAT instance contains the clause (ba ∨ cb). Thus, (b, a) ∈ A or (c, b) ∈ A and
ba = true or cb = true. Hence, ab = false or bc = false, which contradicts our assumption that
{(a, b), (b, c)} ⊆ A.
6. Other Single-Peaked Concepts for Weak Orders
We now turn to three other models of single-peaked preferences for weak orders—Black single-
peaked and single-plateaued preferences, and at the end of the section, necessarily single-peaked
preferences.
For weak orders, it is more common to view a ∼ b as indifference instead of missing informa-
tion (i.e., incompleteness). From the algorithmic point of view, which we had taken so far, this
distinction is mostly irrelevant. From a conceptional point of view, it clearly makes a difference,
in particular for the underlying assumption of voters’ true preferences.
Let us start with the definition of single-peaked preferences as introduced by Black, which
applies to weak orders as well.
Definition 6. A preference profile P of weak orders is Black single-peaked with respect to an
axis A if for every V ∈ P, A can be split at the most-preferred candidate (peak) of V into two
segments X and Y (one of which can be empty) such that V has strictly increasing preferences
along X and strictly decreasing preferences along Y .
In other words, for a weak preference order to be Black single-peaked it must have a single
most-preferred candidate and can only contain indifference between at most two candidates at
each position in the order. Otherwise the segments X and Y referred to in Definition 6 would
not be strictly increasing/decreasing.
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a b c d e f g✁ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✁
(a) Single-Plateaued
a b c d e f g✁ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✁
(b) Black Single-Peaked
a b c d e f g✁ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✁
(c) Possibly Single-Peaked
Figure 4: Overview of Single-Peakedness Models for Weak Orders
A slightly weaker restriction than Black single-peakedness for weak orders is the single-
plateaued restriction (Black, 1958, Chapter 5), which extends the model of Black single-peakedness
to allow voters to state multiple most-preferred candidates (i.e., a single plateau instead of a
single peak).5 The model of possibly single-peaked preferences considered in this paper gener-
alizes both single-plateaued and Black single-peaked preferences. Examples and visualizations
of these three restrictions can be found in Figure 4.
In this section, we have three main goals: In Section 6.1 we differentiate single-peakedness
models with respect to the axiomatic properties they guarantee. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3 we
show that the consecutive ones approach can also be used to solve the consistency problem
for single-plateaued and for Black single-peaked preferences. Finally, in Section 6.4, we briefly
consider the concept of necessarily single-peaked preferences.
6.1 Transitive Majority Relations and Condorcet Winners
Preference profiles that satisfy either the Black single-peaked or single-plateaued restriction have
several desirable properties. One of them is that both Black single-peaked and single-plateaued
preferences guarantee transitive majority relations (Black, 1948, 1958). To be precise, we say
that candidate a is preferred to b by a (strict) majority if |V ∈ P : a ≻ b| > |V ∈ P : b ≻ a|;
in this case we write a >m b, where >m denotes the majority relation. A transitive majority
relation further guarantees the existence of one or more weak Condorcet winners. A candidate a
is a weak Condorcet winner if there is no candidate b with b >m a. Upon closer inspection, the
Black single-peaked and the single-plateaued restriction show different characteristics; we refer
the reader to Barbera` (2007) who further discusses how the amounts of indifference permitted
in these restrictions impact their properties.
The gain in generality for possibly single-peaked preferences comes at a price: This condition
is no longer restrictive enough to guarantee a transitive majority relation. This can be seen
by considering the following simple profile reproduced from (Fishburn, 1973, Table 9.1). Let
P = (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5) with
5. We note that single-plateaued preferences are occasionally referred to as single-peaked preferences,
e.g., in (Fishburn, 1973, Chapter 9).
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V1 : 〈b ≻ a ≻ c〉
V2, V3 : 〈c ≻ b ≻ a〉
V4, V5 : 〈a ≻ b ∼ c〉
The corresponding majority relation satisfies a >m c >m b >m a, and thus is clearly not
transitive. Furthermore, no Condorcet winner exists. Clearly, P is possibly single-peaked with
respect to the axis a✁ b✁ c. Notice that this example is comprised of top orders. Thus, there
exist preference profiles of top orders that are possibly single-peaked and do not have a transitive
majority relation nor a Condorcet winner.
6.2 Single-Plateaued Profiles and Their Recognition
Single-plateaued preferences are a much more restrictive model than possibly single-peaked
preferences since they are essentially Black single-peaked except that each preference order can
have multiple most-preferred candidates (Black, 1958, Chapter 5).
We first provide a characterization of single-plateaued preferences, similar to the v-valley
based characterization of possibly single-peaked preferences (Lemma 2). Since a preference
order must be strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing with respect to an axis (except
for its most-preferred candidates), we can again use the v-valley substructure. Furthermore, we
will need an additional substructure to prevent two candidates that are ranked indifferent in a
voter’s preference order from appearing on the same side of that voter’s peak (plateau).
Definition 7. A preference order V contains a nonpeak plateau with respect to an axis A if
there exist candidates a, b, c,∈ C such that a ✁ b ✁ c on A and V states either a ≻ b ∼ c or
c ≻ b ∼ a.
We can now state the following analogue of Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of weak orders. The following two statements are
equivalent.
(i) The profile P is single-plateaued with respect to A.
(ii) Every vote V ∈ P contains neither a v-valley nor a nonpeak plateau with respect to A.
Proof. Let P be a preference profile of weak orders, and let A be an axis.
If P is single-plateaued with respect to A then for every preference order V ∈ P, A can be
split into segments X, Y , and Z such that V is strictly increasing along X, remaining constant
along Y , and strictly decreasing along Z. Since v is only ever strictly decreasing along Z and
Z is the rightmost segment of A, V cannot contain a v-valley with respect to A. For a nonpeak
plateau to exist with respect to A there must exist candidates a, b, c ∈ C such that a✁ b✁ c in
A and V states either a ≻ b ∼ c or c ≻ b ∼ a.
We first consider the case where V states a ≻ b ∼ c. Since V strictly prefers a to b and a
to c, and both b and c are to the right of a on the axis, we know that both b and c must be in
segment Z. However, V is strictly decreasing along Z, so V cannot have a nonpeak plateau of
this form.
We now consider the case where V states c ≻ b ∼ a. Since V strictly prefers c to a and c
to b, and both a and b are to the left of c on the axis, we know that both a and b must be in
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segment X. However, V is strictly increasing along X, so V cannot have a nonpeak plateau of
this form.
For the other direction, assume that no preference order V ∈ P contains a v-valley with
respect to A and no preference order V ∈ P contains a nonpeak plateau with respect to A.
Since no preference order V ∈ P contains a v-valley with respect to A, we know from Lemma 2
that V is possibly single-peaked with respect to A. Since we also know that no preference order
V ∈ P contains a nonpeak plateau with respect to A it is easy to see that V is single-plateaued
with respect to A.
We now extend the consecutive ones approach from Section 5.1 to single-plateaued profiles.
Since the nonpeak plateau substructure is needed in addition to the v-valley substructure, we
modify Construction 1 so that if a preference order contains a nonpeak plateau with respect to
an axis A, then when the columns of its corresponding preference matrix are permuted according
to A the matrix will contain a row with the sequence · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · . Further notice that if a
preference order ranks three candidates indifferent to each other below its peak (plateau) that
it will have a nonpeak plateau with respect to every possible axis. To handle this case in the
extension to Construction 1 we need to ensure that its corresponding preference matrix will
contain a row with the sequence · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · for every permutation of its columns.
Construction 2. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of weak orders over candidate set C with
|C| = m. For each Vi we initially construct an m ×m binary matrix Xi as described in Con-
struction 1.
The following extensions to Construction 1 ensure that if Vi has a nonpeak plateau with
respect to an axis A then when the columns of Xi are permuted according to A it will not have
the consecutive ones property.
If there exist three candidates a, b, c ∈ C such that Vi states a ∼ b ∼ c and they are not
Vi’s most-preferred candidates, then output a matrix that does not have the consecutive ones
property.
Otherwise, for each pair of candidates a, b ∈ C such that (i) Vi ranks a ∼ b and (i) a and b are
not maximal in Vi, append three additional rows to the matrix Xi: to the column corresponding
to a append
[
0 1 1
]′
, to the column corresponding to b append
[
1 1 0
]′
, to each column
corresponding to a candidate strictly preferred to a and b append
[
1 1 1
]′
, and to each column
corresponding to a remaining candidate append
[
0 0 0
]′
. After constructing a matrix Xi for
each Vi, the matrices X1, . . . ,Xn are row-wise concatenated to yield a matrix X.
Construction 1 ensures that no preference order contains a v-valley and the extensions made
in Construction 2 ensure that no preference order contains a nonpeak plateau. So the following
theorem can be shown by an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 3. Now the presence of
v-valleys or nonpeak plateaus, not just v-valleys, is equivalent to a row containing the sequence
· · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · .
Theorem 7. The Weak Order Single-plateaued Consistency problem can be solved in
O(m2 · n) time.
6.3 Black Single-Peaked Consistency
Recall that a preference order is Black single-peaked with respect to an axis A if it is strictly
increasing to a single most-preferred candidate (peak) and then strictly decreasing with respect
22
to A, this is consequently a special case of single-plateaued preferences. So we again use the
v-valley substructure to obtain a characterization result, but as before we need an additional
substructure. Even if no preference order has a v-valley with respect to A it may not be Black
single-peaked because it is indifferent between two candidates on the same side of its peak or
has more than one most-preferred candidate. We can handle the first condition just mentioned
with the nonpeak plateau substructure used in the previous section, but the second condition
requires us to forbid any kind of plateau.
Definition 8. A preference order V contains a plateau with respect to an axis A if there exist
candidates a, b ∈ C such that a and b are adjacent in A and V states a ∼ b.
We can now use the plateau substructure and the v-valley substructure to state the following
lemma. The proof follows from a similar argument to the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. Let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) be a profile of weak orders. The following two statements are
equivalent.
(i) The profile P is Black single-peaked with respect to A.
(ii) Every vote V ∈ P contains neither a v-valley nor a plateau with respect to A.
Now, we extend Construction 2 so that if a preference order contains a plateau with respect
to an axis A, then when the columns of its preference matrix are permuted according to A the
matrix will contain the sequence · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · . Since Construction 2 already ensures this
for the case of nonpeak plateaus, our extended construction below only needs to add a condition
for plateaus that contain the most-preferred candidates in a given preference order.
Construction 3. Follow Construction 2 except add the following condition while constructing
a preference matrix Xi for each preference order Vi ∈ P. If there exist two candidates a, b ∈ C
such that Vi states a ∼ b and they are Vi’s most-preferred candidates, then output a matrix that
does not have the consecutive ones property.
When a preference order has a unique most-preferred candidate and is single-plateaued, it is
clearly also Black single-peaked. Construction 3 ensures that no preference order contains more
than one most-preferred candidate the same way that Construction 2 ensures that no preference
order contains three or more candidates that are all ranked indifferent to each other and that
are not the most preferred candidates, since this always results in a nonpeak plateau. So the
following theorem can be shown by essentially the same argument as for Theorem 7, but using
Lemma 6 instead of Lemma 5.
Theorem 8. The Weak Order Black Single-peaked Consistency problem can be solved
in O(m2 · n) time.
6.4 Necessarily Single-Peaked Preferences
The central definition of this paper is that of possibly single-peaked preferences. As mentioned
in Section 3, one could also consider necessarily single-peaked preferences, i.e., incomplete pref-
erences for which every extension is single-peaked. We conclude this section by considering
this much more restrictive variant. For weak orders, we can give a clear answer how these two
concepts compare: necessarily single-peaked preferences can be characterized as a subclass of
single-plateaued preferences.
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Proposition 2. A profile of weak orders is necessarily single-peaked with respect to an axis A
if and only if it is single-plateaued with respect to A in such a way that plateaus have a size of
at most two.
Proof. Let P, a profile of weak orders, be single-plateaued with respect to an axis A such that
all plateaus have a size ≤ 2. It is easy to see that for each V ∈ P that every extension of V to
a total order cannot contain a v-valley with respect to A.
For the other direction, we consider two cases: (i) P is not single-plateaued with respect to
A and (ii) P is single-plateaued with respect to axis A but a V ∈ P contains a plateau of size
larger than two. In case (i), we use Lemma 5. There are two ways in which the single-plateaued
property can be violated: a vote V contains a v-valley or a nonpeak plateau with respect to A.
If V contains a v-valley, then none of its extensions is single-peaked with respect to A. If V
contains a nonpeak plateau, then it is of the form a ∼ b ≺ p, where p is a maximal element of
V , with a✁ b✁ p on A (or reversed). Let V ′ be any extension of V for which p ≻′ a ≻′ b holds.
Then V ′ is not single-peaked with respect to A, and hence P is not necessarily single-peaked
with respect to A. Now, consider case (ii). Let V ∈ P with a ∼ b ∼ c, all of which are maximal
elements in V , i.e., we have a plateau of size at least three. Without loss of generality assume
that a ✁ b ✁ c on A. Let V ′ be any extension of V that satisfies a ≻′ b and c ≻′ b. Then V ′
contains a v-valley and thus P is not necessarily single-peaked with respect to A.
Interestingly, this “plateau of size at most two” definition is exactly the way Arrow (1951)
defined single-peakedness, introducing a slight deviation from Black’s original definition (as
mentioned by Dummett and Farquharson (1961)).
7. Discussion and Future Work
We have analyzed the T Single-peaked Consistency problem for T ∈ {Partial Order,
Local Weak Order, Weak Order, Top Order, Total Order}. An overview of the
results are displayed in Table 1. Despite the NP-completeness of Partial Order Single-
peaked Consistency, we have found four fast algorithms for plausible application scenarios.
The Guided Algorithm and the 2-SAT based algorithm each require a guiding vote. Such an
order is likely to exist—at least implicitly—for large preference profiles. In the case that no
guiding order exists, the consecutive ones approach and the Unguided Algorithm are applicable.
In addition, we have found that Partial Order Single-peaked Consistency is solvable in
polynomial time if the axis is already part of the input. This covers a large spectrum of possible
scenarios of real-world preferences where our algorithms could be applied.
We would like to mention one particular application of our algorithms concerning a specific
class of voting rules, so-called scoring rules. Scoring rules are specified by a family of scoring
vectors. For an election over m candidates, a scoring rule uses the corresponding m-candidate
scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm) to determine the winner(s). A vote 〈c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm〉 gives α1 points
to c1, α2 points to c2, etc. The candidate(s) with the highest score win. Often, scoring vectors of
the type (α1, . . . , αk, 0, . . . , 0) with α1 ≥ . . . αk > 0 are considered. For example, the voting in
the Eurovision Song Contest uses the scoring vector (12, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (Ginsburgh
& Noury, 2008). For such scoring vectors, top orders (with k ranked candidates) constitute full
information for determining the winner. It is therefore debatable whether the input of such
voting rules may be considered to be given as a profile of total orders, as total orders contain
problem-irrelevant information. Brandt et al. (2015) study the constructive coalitional weighted
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T general with guiding vote
Partial Order NP-c (Cor 1) NP-c (Thm 2)
Local Weak O. NP-c (Thm 1) O(m3 · n) (Thm 6)
Weak Order O(m2 · n) (Thm 3) O(m · n) (Thm 4)
Top Order O(m2 · n) (Thm 5) O(m · n) (Thm 4)
Total Order O(m · n) (Escoffier et al. (2008), also Thm 4) n/a
Table 1: Overview of the complexity results and algorithms for T Single-Peaked Consis-
tency
manipulation problem for scoring rules in single-peaked elections. The authors consider the axis
to be part of the input (for good reasons as explained in their paper). The computation of such
an axis with existing algorithms is only possible if preferences are specified by total orders and
thus contain problem-irrelevant information. If only relevant information is given, i.e., the input
consists of top orders, algorithms such as those presented in this paper are required.
Let us discuss some directions for future research. A disadvantage of the single-peaked
domain is its poor robustness: even a minor change in a voter’s preferences can violate the
single-peaked condition. This problem has been addressed by considering nearly single-peaked
profiles, i.e., profiles that are close to being single-peaked according to some measure (Elkind,
Faliszewski, & Slinko, 2012; Cornaz, Galand, & Spanjaard, 2012, 2013; Faliszewski, Hemas-
paandra, & Hemaspaandra, 2014; Bredereck, Chen, & Woeginger, 2016; Erde´lyi, Lackner, &
Pfandler, 2017). This work is limited to profiles of total orders; an extension to possibly single-
peaked profiles could further generalize the applicability of single-peakedness. A first step in this
direction has been taken by Menon and Larson (2016), which consider profiles of top orders in
which most voters have single-peaked preferences. Furthermore, work on matrices that almost
satisfy the consecutive ones property (cf. Section 5.1) is highly relevant for this purpose; we refer
the reader to a survey by Dom (2009) for a literature overview.
Finally, work by Lackner and Lackner (2017) and Chen and Finnendahl (2018) analyzed
the number of single-peaked profiles of total orders. To extend this work to profiles of partial
orders could shed light on how much generality can be gained by moving from total orders to
partial orders. Even more interesting would be a comparison of single-peaked concepts for weak
orders (cf. Section 6). Clearly, the possibly single-peaked definition is more general than, e.g.,
the single-plateaued definition—but a quantitative answer is missing.
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Appendix A. Proof details
A.1 Correctness of the Guided Algorithm
We are going to prove that the Guided Algorithm (Algorithm 1) is correct. In the following, we
write a % b to denote that either a ≻ b or a ∼ b. We consider the Guided Algorithm at any
given point during its runtime. In particular, we consider the sets AL and AR as constructed by
the algorithm. Let Vg be the guiding vote in P.
Lemma 7. Let k ∈ [n], aℓ = maxk(AL), ar = maxk(AR), and cj ∈ {ci, . . . , cm}. It either holds
that cj %k ar or that cj %k aℓ.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that aℓ was placed before ar. Towards a contradic-
tion assume that both ar ≻k cj and aℓ ≻k cj . Let us consider the algorithm at the point when
ar was placed (ci′ = ar for some i
′ < i). We will show that (R1) is true and thus ar could not
have been placed on the right-hand side. Recall condition (R1):
ci ≻k mink(C>i) and max
k
(AL) ≻k mink(C>i)
Since ci′ = ar %k cj %k mink(C>i′) and maxk(AL) = aℓ ≻k cj %k mink(C>i′), (R1) is true and
ci′ could not have been placed on the right side of the axis.
Lemma 8. Let k ∈ [n] and cj = maxk(ci, . . . , cm). Furthermore, let a, a
′ ∈ AR such that
candidate a has been placed on AR before a
′. Then it either holds that a′ %k cj or it holds that
a′ %k a.
Proof. We consider the algorithm at the point where a′ was placed on the right-hand side, i.e.,
in AR. At this point, condition (R2) had to be false; the fact that a
′ %k cj or a
′ %k a holds is a
direct consequence.
Proposition 3. The Guided Algorithm (Algorithm 1) is correct, i.e., it outputs an axis if and
only if the given preference profile is single-peaked, and, furthermore, P is single-peaked with
respect to any axis that is returned by the algorithm.
Proof. We first show that if an axis A is found, the profile P is single-peaked with respect to
A. Note that the guiding vote Vg is single-peaked with respect to A, as the Guided Algorithm
constructs A based on Vg. Towards a contradiction assume that there is a vote V ∈ P that
is not single-peaked with respect to A. This means that there are three candidates a, b, c with
order a✁ b✁ c on A, a ≻ b and c ≻ b. We have to distinguish six cases of how a, b, c are ordered
by the guiding vote ≻g:
• a ≺g b ≺g c (a is placed first, then b, then c; other candidates in arbitrary order): Let
us consider the algorithm at the point when b is being placed, i.e., b = ci, and when the
conditions for vote V are being checked. It holds that either a ∈ AL or a ∈ AR. If a ∈ AL,
observe that condition (L2) is satisfied since a ≻ b and c ≻ b. Consequently, b has to be
placed on the right side (left = false). Then it holds that a✁ c✁ b on the axis generated
by the algorithm which contradicts our assumption that a✁ b✁ c holds. In the case that
a ∈ AR condition (R2) is satisfied. This leads to a contradiction by the same argument.
• c ≺g b ≺g a: This case is analogous.
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• a ≺g c ≺g b: Now we consider the point where c is being placed, i.e., c = ci, and when the
conditions for vote V are being checked. It holds that either a ∈ AL or a ∈ AR. If a ∈ AL,
observe that (R1) is satisfied and hence c has to be placed on the left side (right = false).
Then it holds that a✁ c✁ b on the axis generated by the algorithm which contradicts our
assumption that a✁ b ✁ c holds. In the case that a ∈ AR, condition (L1) is satisfied and
we obtain a contradiction by the same argument.
• c ≺g a ≺g b: This case is analogous to the previous one.
• b ≺g c ≺g a or b ≺g a ≺g c: Since b is placed on A before a and c, the resulting axis cannot
be a✁ b✁ c, a contradiction.
For the other direction, let us show that if the algorithm returns not single peaked, then
the profile P is not single-peaked. First, let us observe under what conditions the algorithm
returns not single peaked. There are four cases: Either conditions (R1) and (L1), (R1) and
(L2), (R2) and (L1) or conditions (R2) and (L2) hold. These pairs of conditions may either
hold for the same vote or for two distinct votes; we denote these two votes V and V ′ although
it might be that these two are the same.
• While placing ci, condition (L1) holds for some vote V and condition (R1) holds for some
vote V ′:
We have the following five candidates in these conditions: ar = maxV (AR), ci, cj =
minV (C>i) in condition (L1) and aℓ = maxV ′(AL), ci, c
′
j = minV ′(C>i) in condition (R1).
In Figure 5, the known information about the votes V and V ′ is shown. Since condi-
tion (R1) and (L1) are symmetrical, we can assume without loss of generality that aℓ is
placed before ar. Thus, we can assume that the guiding vote is {cj , c
′
j} ≻g ci ≻g ar ≻g aℓ,
as shown in the figure (the order of cj and c
′
j is not relevant and thus can be arbitrary).
There are four types of axes possible that are compatible with the guiding vote Vg. (The
order of candidates in sets is arbitrary.)
–
〈
aℓ ✁ ci ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ar
〉
: Vote V is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
–
〈
aℓ ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ci ✁ ar
〉
: Vote V ′ is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
–
〈
aℓ ✁ ar ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ci
〉
: Vote V is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
–
〈
aℓ ✁ ar ✁ ci ✁ {cj , c
′
j}
〉
: Consider vote V ′ and Lemma 7. Since aℓ ≻
′ c′j it has to
hold that c′j %
′ ar. Consequently, aℓ ≻
′ ar and ci ≻
′ ar. Thus, the candidates aℓ, ar, ci
form a v-valley for vote V ′.
Since these are all possible axes, we can conclude that the profile is not single-peaked.
• While placing ci, condition (L2) holds for some vote V and condition (R2) holds for some
vote V ′:
This case is similar to the previous one. In particular, we use the same candidate variables.
In Figure 6, the known information about the votes V and V ′ is shown.
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Guiding vote Vg Vote V Vote V
′
c′j cj
ci
ar
aℓ
ar ci
cj
aℓ ci
c′j
Figure 5: Conditions (L1) and (R1)
Guiding vote Vg Vote V Vote V
′
c′j cj
ci
ar
aℓ
aℓ cj
ci
ar c′j
ci
Figure 6: Conditions (L2) and (R2)
There are four types of axes possible that are compatible with Vg. (The order of candidates
in sets is arbitrary.)
–
〈
aℓ ✁ ci ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ar
〉
: Vote V is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
–
〈
aℓ ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ci ✁ ar
〉
: Vote V ′ is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
–
〈
aℓ ✁ ar ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ci
〉
: Consider vote V and Lemma 7. Since aℓ ≻ ci it has to hold
that ci % ar. Thus, the candidates aℓ, ar, cj form a v-valley for vote V .
–
〈
aℓ ✁ ar ✁ ci ✁ {cj , c
′
j}
〉
: Vote V ′ is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
• While placing ci, condition (L1) holds for vote V and condition (R2) holds for vote V
′:
We have the following five candidates in these conditions: ar = maxV (AR) ci, cj =
minV (C>i) in condition (L1) and a
′
r = maxV ′(AR), ci, c
′
j = minV ′(C>i) in condition (R2).
In Figure 7, the known information about the votes V and V ′ is shown. In the following
arguments it is irrelevant which of cj and c
′
j is placed first. However, for ar and a
′
r this is
relevant. We will consider both possibilities (cases 1 and 2 in Figure 7). There are four
types of axes possible that are compatible with either of these two guiding votes. (The
order of candidates in sets is arbitrary.)
–
〈
{ar, a
′
r}✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ci
〉
: Vote V is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of this
type (or their reverse).
–
〈
{ar, a
′
r}✁ ci ✁ {cj , c
′
j}
〉
: Vote V ′ is not single-peaked with respect to any axis of
this type (or their reverse).
–
〈
ar ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ ci ✁ a
′
r
〉
: Both V and V ′ are not single-peaked with respect to any
axis of this type (or their reverse).
–
〈
ar ✁ ci ✁ {cj , c
′
j}✁ a
′
r
〉
: Here we have to distinguish whether ar or a
′
r is placed first
(case 1 and 2 in Figure 7).
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Guiding vote Vg Guiding vote Vg Vote V Vote V
′
(case 1) (case 2)
c′j cj
ci
ar
a′r
c′j cj
ci
a′r
ar
ci ar
cj
c′j a
′
r
ci
Figure 7: Condition (L1) and Condition (R2)
Case 1 (a′r ≺g ar): Lemma 8 applied to V
′ implies that either (i) ar %
′ ci or (ii)
ar %
′ a′r. In both cases we encounter a valley with respect to vote V
′ for the
candidates {ar, a
′
r, ci}.
Case 2 (ar ≺g a
′
r): This case is similar to the previous. Lemma 8 applied to V implies
that either (i) ar % cj or (ii) a
′
r % ar. In both cases we encounter a valley with
respect to vote V for the candidates {a′r, ar, cj}.
We see that in both cases either V or V ′ is not single-peaked with respect to any axis
of this type (or their reverse).
• While placing ci, condition (L2) holds for some vote and condition (R1) holds for some
vote:
This can be shown analogously to the previous case since (R1) and (L1) are symmetrical
as well as (R2) and (L2), cf. Figure 3.
We have shown that if the algorithm returns not single peaked then the profile P is indeed
not single-peaked.
A.2 Runtime and Correctness for the Unguided Algorithm
Theorem 5. The Top Order Single-peaked Consistency problem can be solved in O(m2 · n)
time.
Proof. Let us first discuss the runtime of Algorithm 2. Some functions have to be precomputed
to achieve the O(m2 · n) runtime, in particular the function IntersectingVote. The function
IntersectingVote(A) returns a vote V with A∩V 6= ∅ and V \A 6= ∅. We show that it suffices
to compute a list of 2m votes to answer IntersectingVote function calls in constant time. Let
us first make the following observation: Let c ∈ C. Consider the set of votes for which the sets
{c′ ∈ C | c′ ≻ c} are maximal (with respect to ⊆). If we consider a single-peaked axis, then
candidates in such a set have to form a contiguous subsequence either directly left or directly
right of c. Since these sets are maximal, only two of them can exist (assuming single-peakedness).
Consequently, we compute these maximal sets for each candidate. If three or more exist for one
candidate, we can terminate the algorithm already at this point. Also, if two maximal sets have
a non-empty intersection, the algorithm terminates. (The candidates in the intersection would
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have to lie left and right of c). Otherwise we store the (at most) two corresponding votes for
each candidate.
Let A = 〈a1 ✁ . . .✁ ai−1 ✁ ai〉, i.e., ai is the rightmost candidate in the incomplete axis A.
The function call IntersectingVote(A) can now be answered by considering the one or two
maximal votes for ai. The function simply returns the vote where ai−1 is not ranked higher
than ai. (It might be that both votes do not rank ai−1 higher than ai. In this case A cannot be
extended to a single-peaked axis, but this is going to be detected by algorithm. Any of the two
axes can be returned.)
It remains to observe that finding the (at most two) maximal votes for a candidate c requires
O(m · n) time. This has to be done for every candidate and consequently this preprocessing
requires O(m2 · n) time.
We can now analyze the runtime of the algorithm. The main loop (line 1) iterates over all
m candidates. The loop in line 4 iterates over every vote at most once. Consequently, the ⊕
operator is applied at most n times. Since A⊕ V can be computed in O(m) time, the lines 4 to
7 have a total runtime of O(m2 · n).
It remains to determine the runtime of the lines 8 to 20. Due to the preprocessing of the
IntersectingVote procedure we can obtain V in constant time. The profile P ′ can be generated
in O(|C ′| ·n) time. Applying the Guided Algorithm requires O(|C ′| ·n) time as well (Theorem 4).
Observe that after applying the Guided Algorithm the candidates in C ′ are placed on the axis.
Consequently, the Guided Algorithm is always applied to a disjoint set of candidates (except
maybe ai). Hence for a fixed cstart ∈ C, the total runtime of the Guided Algorithm is O(m · n).
Taking the loop in line 1 into account, we obtain a total runtime of O(m2 · n).
Let us now show that the Unguided Algorithm (Algorithm 2) is correct, i.e., it outputs an axis
if and only if the given preference profile is single-peaked and, furthermore, P is single-peaked
with respect to any axis that is returned by the algorithm. If the algorithm outputs an axis, it
is certainly single-peaked since this is tested for every vote in line 5. By the same argument, one
can conclude that if the profile is not single-peaked, the algorithm returns not single peaked.
It remains to prove that the algorithm always returns a valid axis in case of a single-peaked
profile. Let us consider the algorithm at the time when cstart is the leftmost candidate of a valid
axis. We show that the algorithm will find a complete axis with cstart as leftmost candidate.
First, observe that for every i in line 3 either there is a vote V with ai as its top-ranked candidate
or the condition in line 8 is true. In the first case, it is easy to verify that the ⊕ operator adds
candidates to the axis in the only possible way. In the second case, an intersecting vote is found
as guaranteed by the connectedness condition. Then the Guided Algorithm is applied and the
axis is extended by the candidates in C ′. It remains to verify that the resulting axis A is single-
peaked for all votes with a non-empty intersection with C ′. This is guaranteed by the x element,
which ensures that candidates outside of A ∪ C ′ are taken into account.
References
Arrow, K. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. John Wiley and Sons.
Aspvall, B., Plass, M., & Tarjan, R. (1979). A linear-time algorithm for testing the truth of
certain quantified Boolean formulas. Information Processing Letters, 8 (3), 121–123.
Aziz, H. (2014). Testing top monotonicity. Tech. rep. arXiv:1403.7625 [cs.GT], arXiv.org.
30
Ballester, M. A., & Haeringer, G. (2011). A characterization of the single-peaked domain. Social
Choice and Welfare, 36 (2), 305–322.
Barbera`, S. (2007). Indifferences and domain restrictions. Analyse & Kritik, 29 (2), 146–162.
Barbera`, S., & Moreno, B. (2011). Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness,
single crossing and the median voter result. Games and Economic Behavior, 73 (2), 345–
359.
Bartholdi, III, J., Tovey, C., & Trick, M. (1989). Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to
tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6 (2), 157–165.
Bartholdi, III, J., & Trick, M. (1986). Stable matching with preferences derived from a psycho-
logical model. Operations Research Letters, 5 (4), 165–169.
Baumeister, D., Faliszewski, P., Lang, J., & Rothe, J. (2012). Campaigns for lazy voters: Trun-
cated ballots. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), pp. 577–584. IFAAMAS.
Baumeister, D., & Rothe, J. (2012). Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible
winner problem in pure scoring rules. Information Processing Letters, 112 (5), 186 – 190.
Betzler, N., Slinko, A., & Uhlmann, J. (2013). On the computation of fully proportional repre-
sentation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 47, 475–519.
Betzler, N., & Dorn, B. (2010). Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections
based on scoring rules. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 76 (8), 812–836.
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy,
56 (1), 23–34.
Black, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press.
Booth, K., & Lueker, G. (1976). Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs,
and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms. Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
13 (3), 335–379.
Boutilier, C., & Rosenschein, J. (2016). Incomplete information and communication in voting.
In Brandt, F., Conitzer, V., Endriss, U., Lang, J., & Procaccia, A. (Eds.), Handbook of
Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press.
Brandt, F., Brill, M., Hemaspaandra, E., & Hemaspaandra, L. (2015). Bypassing combinatorial
protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research, 53, 439–496.
Bredereck, R., Chen, J., & Woeginger, G. (2013). A characterization of the single-crossing
domain. Social Choice and Welfare, 41 (4), 989–998.
Bredereck, R., Chen, J., & Woeginger, G. J. (2016). Are there any nicely structured preference
profiles nearby?. Mathematical Social Sciences, 79, 61–73.
Cantala, D. (2004). Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option.
Social Choice and Welfare, 22 (3), 491–514.
Chen, J., & Finnendahl, U. (2018). On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing
narcissistic preference profiles. Discrete Mathematics, 341 (5), 1225–1236.
Chen, J., Pruhs, K. R., & Woeginger, G. J. (2017). The one-dimensional euclidean domain:
finitely many obstructions are not enough. Social Choice and Welfare, 48 (2), 409–432.
31
Conitzer, V. (2009). Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research, 35, 161–191.
Cornaz, D., Galand, L., & Spanjaard, O. (2013). Kemeny elections with bounded single-peaked
or single-crossing width. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013), pp. 76–82. IJCAI/AAAI Press.
Cornaz, D., Galand, L., & Spanjaard, O. (2012). Bounded single-peaked width and proportional
representation. In Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(ECAI 2012), pp. 270–275. IOS Press.
Doignon, J.-P., & Falmagne, J.-C. (1994). A polynomial time algorithm for unidimensional
unfolding representations. Journal of Algorithms, 16 (2), 218–233.
Dom, M. (2009). Algorithmic aspects of the consecutive-ones property. In Bulletin of the
European Association for Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 98, pp. 27–59. EATCS.
Dummett, M., & Farquharson, R. (1961). Stability in voting. Econometrica, 29 (1), 33–43.
Dwork, C., Kumar, R., Naor, M., & Sivakumar, D. (2001). Rank aggregation methods for the
web. In Proceedings of the 10th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW 2001),
pp. 613–622. ACM Press.
Elkind, E., Faliszewski, P., Lackner, M., & Obraztsova, S. (2015). The complexity of recognizing
incomplete single-crossing preferences. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2015), pp. 865–871. AAAI Press.
Elkind, E., Faliszewski, P., & Slinko, A. (2012). Clone structures in voters’ preferences. In
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC 2012), pp. 496–513.
ACM.
Elkind, E., & Ismaili, A. (2015). OWA-based extensions of the chamberlin–courant rule. In
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT
2015), pp. 486–502. Springer.
Elkind, E., Lackner, M., & Peters, D. (2016). Preference restrictions in computational social
choice: Recent progress. In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2016), pp. 4062–4065. IJCAI/AAAI Press.
Elkind, E., Lackner, M., & Peters, D. (2017). Structured preferences. In Endriss, U. (Ed.),
Trends in Computational Social Choice, chap. 10, pp. 187–207. AI Access.
Erde´lyi, G., Lackner, M., & Pfandler, A. (2017). Computational aspects of nearly single-peaked
electorates. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 58, 297–337.
Escoffier, B., Lang, J., & O¨ztu¨rk, M. (2008). Single-peaked consistency and its complexity. In
Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2008), pp.
366–370.
Fagin, R., Kumar, R., Mahdian, M., Sivakumar, D., & Vee, E. (2006). Comparing partial
rankings. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 20 (3), 628–648.
Fagin, R., Kumar, R., & Sivakumar, D. (2003). Comparing top k lists. SIAM Journal on Discrete
Mathematics, 17 (1), 134–160.
Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., & Hemaspaandra, L. (2014). The complexity of manipulative
attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates. Artificial Intelligence, 207, 69–99.
32
Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., & Rothe, J. (2011). The shield that never
was: Societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control.
Information and Computation, 209 (2), 89–107.
Fishburn, P. (1973). The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton University Press.
Fitzsimmons, Z., & Hemaspaandra, E. (2015). Complexity of manipulative actions when voting
with ties. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision
Theory (ADT 2015), pp. 103–119. Springer.
Fitzsimmons, Z. (2015). Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy. In Proceedings of the
15th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2015), pp.
127–140.
Fitzsimmons, Z., & Hemaspaandra, E. (2016). Modeling single-peakedness for votes with ties.
In Proceedings of the 8th European Starting AI Researcher Symposium (STAIRS 2016),
pp. 63–74. IOS Press.
Fulkerson, D., & Gross, G. (1965). Incidence matrices and interval graphs. Pacific Journal of
Mathematics, 15 (5), 835–855.
Gaertner, W. (2002). Domain restrictions. In Arrow, K., Sen, A., & Suzumura, K. (Eds.),
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1, chap. 3, pp. 131–170. Elsevier.
Garey, M., & Johnson, D. (1979). Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of
NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company.
Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica, 41 (4), 587–601.
Ginsburgh, V., & Noury, A. (2008). The Eurovision song contest. Is voting political or cultural?.
European Journal of Political Economy, 24 (1), 41–52.
Habib, M., McConnell, R., Paul, C., & Viennot, L. (2000). Lex-BFS and partition refinement,
with applications to transitive orientation, interval graph recognition and consecutive ones
testing. Theoretical Computer Science, 234 (1), 59–84.
Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., & Rothe, J. (2016). The complexity of manipulative
actions in single-peaked societies. In Rothe, J. (Ed.), Economics and Computation, pp.
327–360. Springer.
Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L. A., & Rothe, J. (1997). Exact analysis of Dodgson elec-
tions: Lewis Carroll’s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to NP. Journal of
the ACM, 44 (6), 806–825.
Hemaspaandra, E., Spakowski, H., & Vogel, J. (2005). The complexity of Kemeny elections.
Theoretical Computer Science, 349 (3), 382–391.
Konczak, K., & Lang, J. (2005). Voting procedures with incomplete preferences. In Proceedings
of the 1st Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling (MPref 2005),
pp. 124–129.
Lackner, M.-L., & Lackner, M. (2017). On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences. Social
Choice and Welfare, 48 (4), 717–745.
Lackner, M. (2014). Incomplete preferences in single-peaked electorates. In Proceedings of the
28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2014), pp. 742–748. AAAI Press.
33
Magiera, K., & Faliszewski, P. (2017). Recognizing top-monotonic preference profiles in polyno-
mial time. In Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI 2017), pp. 324–330. IJCAI/AAAI Press.
McConnell, R. M. (2004). A certifying algorithm for the consecutive-ones property. In Pro-
ceedings of the 15th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 768–777.
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Meidanis, J., Porto, O., & Telles, G. P. (1998). On the consecutive ones property. Discrete
Applied Mathematics, 88 (1), 325–354.
Menon, V., & Larson, K. (2017). Computational aspects of strategic behaviour in elections with
top-truncated ballots. Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 31 (6), 1506–1547.
Menon, V., & Larson, K. (2016). Reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and
bribery in single-peaked and nearly single-peaked electorates. In Schuurmans, D., & Well-
man, M. P. (Eds.), Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
February 12-17, 2016, Phoenix, Arizona, USA., pp. 565–571. AAAI Press.
Moulin, H. (1991). Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press.
Moulin, H. (1984). Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau prefer-
ences. Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (2), 127–147.
Opatrny, J. (1979). Total ordering problem. SIAM Journal on Computing, 8 (1), 111–114.
Peters, D. (2017). Recognising multidimensional Euclidean preferences. In Proceedings of the
31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2017), pp. 642–648. AAAI Press.
Peters, D. (2018). Single-peakedness and total unimodularity: New polynomial-time algorithms
for multi-winner elections. In Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI 2018), pp. 1169–1176. AAAI Press.
Peters, D., & Lackner, M. (2017). Preferences single-peaked on a circle. In Proceedings of the
31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2017), pp. 649–655. AAAI Press.
Pini, M., Rossi, F., Venable, K., & Walsh, T. (2011). Incompleteness and incomparability in
preference aggregation: Complexity results. Artificial Intelligence, 175 (7-8), 1272–1289.
Rothe, J., Spakowski, H., & Vogel, J. (2003). Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young
elections. Theory of Computing Systems, 36 (4), 375–386.
Satterthwaite, M. (1975). Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspon-
dence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic
Theory, 10 (2), 187–217.
Walsh, T. (2007). Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation. In Proceedings of the
22nd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2007), pp. 3–8. AAAI Press.
Xia, L., & Conitzer, V. (2011). Determining possible and necessary winners under common
voting rules given partial orders. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 41 (2), 25–67.
34
